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BOOK REVIEW
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDiCIAL REVIEW. By John
Hart Ely. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1980. Pp. viii, 268. $15.00.
Reviewed by Michael Conant*
I. INTRODUCTION
This review is a critique of the major themes in Democracy
and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review,' by Professor John
Hart Ely of Harvard Law School. Ely primarily addresses the
amount of discretion exercised by Supreme Court justices in decid-
ing constitutional cases, a fundamental issue since few scholars to-
day would contest the actual existence of the judicial review power
of the Court. Ely's thorough scholarship presents a fine discussion
of the Court's legitimacy when it extends its discretion beyond the
base of the actual constitutional language. Professor Ely misses the
mark, however, in his argument that certain open-ended constitu-
tional provisions exist and are necessary for the judicial safeguard-
ing of important substantive rights. Contrary to Ely's contention,
strict construction of constitutional language can be consistent
with the need of the Court both to adjudicate those rights and at
the same time to remain mindful of its countermajoritarian nature.
II. INTERPRETIVISM AND THE COURT
Ely's first chapter is entitled, "The Allure of Interpretivism."
"Interpretivism" is the new term for legal positivism or strict con-
struction.2 Ely notes that despite the towering position of Justice
Black as a fundamentalist in the theory of interpretivism, Black
was not its creator. Instead, this methodology of construction, cen-
tering on constitutional language and contemporary rules of docu-
mentary interpretation, was asserted early on by Chief Justice
* Professor, School of Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley.
B.S., 1945, University of Illinois; A.M., 1946, Ph.D., 1949, J.D., 1951, University of Chicago.
1. J. ELY, DEMocRACY AND DisTRuSr. A THEORY OF JUDmcuL REvIEw (1980).
2. See Grey, Do We RHave an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
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Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.3 It also was explained in detail
by Justice Story4 and summarized by Justice Holmes.5 The express
foundation of interpretivism is the constitutional separation of
governmental powers and the reservation of the amending power
to the people,' and Justices Holmes and Black are prime examples
of those who emphasized this foundation and assured us that the
Constitution did not give unlimited discretion to justices to impose
their personal value judgments on society. Ely points out that in-
terpretivism recognizes the undemocratic character of judicial re-
view. The philosophical principle is that an appointed elite in the
judiciary should abnegate expansion of broad judicial review power
in favor of the power of the elected legislatures, which are the cen-
ters of democratic responsibility.
Ely rejects interpretivism when it is defined in extreme terms.
His second chapter, entitled "The Impossibility of a Clause-Bound
Interpretivism," denounces any approach that considers each
clause as a self-contained unit to be interpreted on the basis of its
language and legislative history. The strict construction of Justices
Story and Holmes, however, also rejected such a narrow approach
to interpretation.8 In fact, the Justices argued that the documents
should be interpreted in their total context, and that the Constitu-
tion must be understood as a unified whole within the English con-
stitutional and common-law legal environment of its adoption.9
Under eighteenth-century rules of documentary interpretation, for
example, preambles were given great weight.10 For this reason, the
breadth of the spending power of Congress can be understood only
in the framework of the language of the preamble.' By ignoring
the accepted broad principles of construction for constitutions, as
outlined by Justice Story, Ely creates a straw man to destroy.
Upon this foundation he builds his later arguments for interpreta-
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, §§ 397-456
(2d ed. Boston 1857).
5. O.W. HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 203
(1920).
6. U.S. CONST. arts. I, H, M, V.
7. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522-24 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.); O.W. HOLMES, supra note 5.
8. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
9. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925); United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649, 668-72 (1898). On the English constitutional context in which the state and
national constitutions were drafted, see authorities cited in note 42 infra.
10. See J. STORY, supra note 4, at §§ 451-517.
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
[Vol. 34:233234
BOOK REVIEW
tion beyond the constraints of constitutional language.
As pointed out correctly in this book, constitutional provisions
range on a spectrum from specific denotation to very general con-
notation.1 2 The age requirement to be President is an example of
the former,18 while the word "commerce" is an example of the lat-
ter. In 1789, commerce connoted all transactions, such as the
purchase and sale of all land, goods, services, and legal rights.1'
Although certain types of commerce did not exist in 1789, no one
doubts the power of Congress to regulate transactions in such
things as light bulbs, airline travel, and copyrights of videotapes.
Due process is another term of general connotation. In 1791, it
meant required or appropriate procedure, the main components of
which were adequate notice and full and fair hearing.1" Its content,
however, cannot be limited to specific acts found unfair in 1791.
The creative genius of prosecutors, police, and other administra-
tive officers to devise novel procedures that are unfair to litigants
under any generally accepted value standards means that the spe-
cific content of fair procedure must be an evolving aggregate.
Ely recognizes the overwhelming evidence that substantive
due process, as an open-ended vehicle for constitutional interpreta-
tion, is an unwarranted judicial fabrication that cannot provide a
rational basis for extending judicial review.18 In fact, he has pub-
lished an incisive article showing that abortion decisions based on
substantive due process are incorrect.17 Having rejected due pro-
cess as a technique for the judiciary to create unenumerated sub-
stantive rights, however, Ely suggests that two other clauses-the
"privileges or immunities" provision of the fourteenth amendment,
and the ninth amendment-can perform that same unwarranted
function.' e According to Ely, these parts of the Constitution are
open-ended and can serve as the basis for the antidemocratic exer-
cise of judicial discretion beyond the limits of express constitu-
tional language. A critical review shows that while Ely understands
the true meaning of due process, he joins a large body of courts
12. See M. BLACK, CRrTcAL THDmUnG 192-94 (2d ed. 1952).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. H, J 1, 1 5.
14. See 1 W. CnOSSKY, POLITICS AND Tim CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNtroD STATES, ch. 4 (1953).
15. See 2 id. at 1102-10; Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-Judicial Rise of
Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CALU. L. Ray. 483 (1952) and sources cited therein.
16. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 14-21.
17. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALz L.J. 920
(1973).
18. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 22-30, 34-41.
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and scholars in failing to realize that the privileges or immunities
clause and the ninth amendment each have discoverable meanings
to which the courts should adhere. How is the content of these
constitutional provisions to be discerned? Ely realizes that correct
methodology in constitutional interpretation cannot be based on
legislative history, the alleged intents of the many differing fram-
ers. 19 What Ely recognizes but does not pursue, however, is that
historical linguistics should be the basis of constitutional interpre-
tation. The language of the Constitution in total context at the
time of its adoption and contemporary rules of documentary inter-
pretation are the proper tools. Using these tools, an argument can
be made about the meanings of the privileges or immunities clause
and of the ninth amendment that would allow the Court to protect
certain rights without violating its duty in a democratic society to
adhere strictly to the language of the Constitution.
HI. THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The word "privileges," when referring to the relationship of
citizen to government in the interstate privileges and immunities
clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution, was'a synonym
for the words "liberties" or "franchises."2 It represented affirma-
tive or active liberties that government had no legal right to re-
strain. The word "immunity," when used in the context of the rela-
tionship of citizen to government, meant "exemption.' 1  It
designated negative or passive liberties, the citizens' freedom in
certain areas from the legal power of intervention by the govern-
ment, such as the immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Privileges and immunities, or synonymous terms, had their
American law origins in the charter of Virginia of 16062 and in the
charters of many of the other colonies.2 3 The terms appear in Dec-
19. Id. at 16-18. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 119; Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 502 (1964). But see C. CuRIns, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2 (1947).
20. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 37 (1765); 8 C.
VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT OF LAW AND EQurry 508 (2d ed. 1791).
21. See G. JACOB, LAW DICTIONARY 389 (1811).
22. The charter declared that all colonists "shall have and enjoy all Liberties,
Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Dominions, to all intents and purposes,
as if they had been abiding and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our
said Dominions." 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONsTmrUnONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER OR-
GANIC LAWS 3788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).
23. Charter of New England (1620), 3 id. at 1822, 1839; Charter of Massachusetts Bay
[Vol. 34:233236
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larations of Rights made by colonists pursuant to their power to
make law consistent with their charters.24 These words are also in
the Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress of 176525 and in the
Declaration and Resolves of the Continental Congress of October
14, 1774.28 Thus the words had established meaning when they
were included in article IV of the Articles of Confederation.27 As
Professor Howard's comprehensive study shows, "privileges and
immunities" was a summary phrase to connote all constitutional
rights of citizens against government, the constitutional limitations
on government.' 8
For purposes of the subsequent discussion of the ninth
amendment, it is important to note that the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens in article IV of the Articles of Confederation were
primarily those of the English Constitution. This fact is clearly
seen in the first committee draft of July 12, 1776, in which clause
VI read: "The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always
have the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Ad-
vantages, in the other Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now
(1629), 3 id. at 1846, 1856-57; Charter of Maryland (1632), 3 id. at 1677, 1681; Grant of the
Province of Maine (1639), 3 id. at 1625, 1635; Charter of Connecticut (1662), 1 id. at 529,
533; Charter of Carolina (1663), 5 id. at 2743, 2747; Charter of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations (1663), 6 id. at 3211, 3220; Charter of Carolina (1665), 5 id. at 2761, 2765; Char-
ter of Massachusetts Bay (1691), 3 id. at 1870, 1880-81; Charter of Georgia (1732), 2 id. at
765, 773.
24. See, e.g., The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, which spoke of "the free
fruition of such Liberties, Immunities, Privileges as Humanity, Civility and Christianity call
for.. . ." THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 1 (W. Whitmore ed. 1889).
25. "II. That his Majesty's liege subjects in these colonies, are entitled to all the inher-
ent rights and liberties of his natural born subjects, within the kingdom of Great-Britain."
A. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERIcA 135 (1965).
26. Resolved, N.C.D. 2. That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at
the time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liber-
ties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects, within the realm of England.
Resolved, N.C.D. 3. That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surren-
dered, or lost any of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are,
entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other
circumstances enable them to exercise and enjoy.
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENrAL CONGRESS 68 (reprint ed. 1904).
27. Art. 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of
these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, im-
positions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively ....
9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908 (reprint ed. 1907).
28. A. HOwARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 1-215 (1968).
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have, in all Cases whatever, except in those provided for by the
next following Article."29 Since this language was written before
most states had adopted constitutions, the phrase "which the said
inhabitants now have" had to refer to the English constitutional
limitations. In other words, the Declaration of Independence dis-
carded those parts of the English Constitution that imposed a
framework of government but not the constitutional rights of En-
glishmen that the colonists had for so long argued were theirs.
The interstate privileges and immunities clause of the Consti-
tution, article IV, states: "The Citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." In light of the English constitutional background, this lan-
guage seems ambiguous. As the Republicans argued at the time of
the Civil War, it could have more than interstate application. 0
The phrase could connote all constitutional rights of Americans in-
cluding those in state and federal constitutions. They argued that
"in the several states" meant in the United States and was not the
same as "of the several states." The majority interpretation, how-
ever, asserted the limited, interstate character of the clause. Thus,
citizens of one state, visiting a second, are entitled to all the con-
stitutional protections found in the law of the second. Visitors are
not, however, entitled to privileges created by ordinary statutes of
the second state, such as the collection of oysters in its waters.31
The distinction, then, is between ordinary law and law that is fun-
damental. As used by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell,32
following eighteenth-century usage, the word "fundamental" is a
synonym for "constitutional."33
This English and American legal-linguistic history gives a
29. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 546, 547 (reprint ed. 1906). Article VII
of the first draft reads as follows: "The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights,
Liberties, Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and Commerce, in
any other Colony, and in going to and from the same from and to any Part of the World,
which the Natives of such Colony ... enjoy."
30. L. SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1845), and J. TIFFANY, A
TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY: TOGETHER WITH THE POWERS
AND DUTIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO THAT SUBJECT (1849) are cited on
the issue in J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 86-93
(1951).
31. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
32. Id. at 551-52. See J. ELY, supra note 1, at 28-30.
33. Though the term "fundamental law" was used in an earlier era to mean natural
law, by the seventeenth century it had come to have a specific meaning in positive law as a
synonym of constitutional. See J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY (rev. ed. 1971).
[Vol. 34:233
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clear meaning to the words "privileges or immunities" when rati-
fied as part of the fourteenth amendment."' Since "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" was a synonym for
constitutional limitations, the fourteenth amendment reference is
to the national constitutional limitations. It can only refer to those
rights of citizens against the United States found in the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The states are prohibited from
making or enforcing any law that would abridge those classes of
legal rights against government delineated in the national Consti-
tution. Thus, traditional documentary interpretation confirms the
view of Justice Black that the language of the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights as against the states.3 5
In fact, the privileges or immunities clause is the only clause that
can rationally incorporate the first, second, and third amend-
ments-the substantive amendments-since the due process clause
correctly refers only to procedural protections.3 6
The majority opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases'7 men-
tioned this issue only in dictum, since it held the claim against
state grants of monopoly in the ordinary trades to be an issue of
state constitutional law and not one of national privileges or im-
munities. Justice Miller did note that the clause included those
privileges or immunities "which owe their existence to the Federal
government" such as "the right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances."38 Implicitly he thus recognized that the
privileges or immunities clause incorporated first amendment
rights against the states. Although some later courts misread this
dictum and held that the privileges or immunities clause did not
incorporate the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment in fact
contains a partial redundancy on the issue of incorporation. It in-
34. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The pur-
suit of the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment by Justice Black and Profes-
sor Fairman is a prime example of the futile search for history when the correct methodol-
ogy requires search for the meaning of language. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). But see J. ELY, supra
note 1, at 16-18. See generally Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7
STAN. L. REv. 3 (1954).
36. The Supreme Court erroneously used substantive due process to absorb the first
amendment into the fourteenth. See Cantrell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); DeJonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
37. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
38. Id. at 79.
1981]
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corporates the procedural protections of amendments four through
eight twice-once via the privileges or immunities clause and once
via the due process clause.39
The conclusion to be drawn from three hundred and fifty
years of legal history is that the privileges or immunities clause is
not, as Ely contends, open-ended. It refers to established national
constitutional rights of citizens that can be found in the original
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or in contemporary English consti-
tutional law.
IV. THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The ninth amendment provided that "[t]he enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." 40 It sets forth a rule of
construction for those courts and agencies that interpret the Con-
stitution. The amendment notes that certain of the rights of citi-
zens against government (privileges and immunities) have been
enumerated in the Constitution and Bill of Rights and implies that
others existent at the time these documents were adopted were
unenumerated. The immediate question raised by this is where
could one find the rights that were unenumerated? The only ra-
tional answer is that one must look to the substantive standing
constitutional law of England and of the American states in 1791.41
Many authors have detailed the English constitutional foundation
of the civil rights (privileges and immunities) that are incorporated
into the state and national constitutions. 2 Enumeration of some of
39. The due process clause of the fifth amendment, as noted by Justice Curtis, was a
general requirement of fair procedure that included the procedural protections of the fourth
through eighth amendments and all the rules for procedural protection having their origin
in English legal history. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855). Since the language of due process in the fourteenth amendment was
adopted from the fifth amendment, the rules of documentary interpretation require that
they have the same meaning. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Fourteenth amendment due process thus must incorporate, inter alia, amend-
ments four through eight. The whole framework of Anglo-American constitutional history
demonstrates that Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and its progeny are wrong.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
41. The due process clause of the fifth amendment was designed to incorporate all
procedural protections of standing English constitutional law. See note 39 supra. Hence, the
ninth amendment could only refer to the unenumerated substantive protections. See Van
Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1968).
42. "The Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Consti-
tution; but the British Constitution which served as its original was that which was in exis-
tence between 1760 and 1787." H. MAINE, POPULAR GOVERNMENT 253 (6th ed. 1909). See E.
CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948); A. HOWARD, supra note 28; R. POUND, THE
240 [Vol. 34:233
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them in absolute form, such as the first amendment, have made
them more comprehensive than they were in the English constitu-
tion. There is no doubt, however, that most of them have English
origins. Article I, section 9, of the Constitution, though procedural,
is a good example of the derivation. It reads: "The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.'""
This language implies the existence of a privilege of writ of habeas
corpus before adoption of this clause preserving it. Justice Story's
historical analysis establishes that the right derived from the En-
glish Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.44
The rules of documentary interpretation require that the clas-
ses of unenumerated substantive rights be defined as of 1791."
None of the meager literature on the ninth amendment has done
this, and a project of such scope cannot be presented here.4 The
important point is that Professor Ely is incorrect to conclude that
a technical rule of construction can authorize judicial creation of
new substantive civil rights. The clause cannot be an open-ended
vehicle for Supreme Court review, as Ely contends, unguided by
the established English and state constitutional law of the time.
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut47
is exemplary. He creates a new ninth amendment right from his
personal values on statutes limiting birth control. There was, how-
ever, no class of English constitutional immunities against govern-
ment in 1791 relating to privacy in the general sense under which a
statute preventing birth control could be subsumed.'8
DzsLopmrNT OF CONSMUMONAL GUANTEES OF LmFSRTY (1957); C. STEVENS, SOURCES OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1894); A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 25.
43. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9.
44. 2 J. STORY, supra note 4, at §§ 1338, 1342.
45. 1 J. STORY, supra note 4, at § 405 (citing three Supreme Court opinions).
46. For the unfounded argument that the ninth amendment incorporates natural law
as a tool of judicial decision, see B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NNTH AmENDMENT (1955).
But see note 51 infra.
47. 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965). The development of a private-law tort remedy for inva-
sion of privacy can have no bearing on public law, when new substantive rights and reme-
dies against government must be created by statute or constitutional amendment. See Gris-
wold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
48. A search through Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England





Professor Ely's third chapter is a masterful disposition of the
argument that five-person Supreme Court majorities can select
fundamental values for society superior to those adopted by major-
ities in legislatures. Ely points out that, whatever the label, the
selection of fundamental values is equal to the imposition by
judges of their own personal values on society. The Supreme Court
majority's use of substantive due process to hold unconstitutional
many labor laws passed by almost unanimous votes of Congress or
state legislatures is a prime example.49 Ely notes that this imposi-
tion of personal values by judges can have many labels. Natural
law, as demonstrated by Justice Holmes, is of this character; 50 and
leading historians and legal scholars have demonstrated that the
founding fathers rejected natural law as a judicial decisionmaking
tool.51 Ely also reviews judicial usurpations of governing power
under such labels as neutral principles, reason, tradition, consen-
sus, and predicting progress.
Having concluded that certain constitutional clauses are open-
ended, but that overly broad discretion in the Supreme Court to
create new substantive rights is inappropriate, Ely faces the prob-
lem of finding standards for judicial decisions that go beyond the
enumerated clauses. His argument is first based upon the impor-
tance of policing the processes of legislative representation. From
49. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hoasp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled, West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also
R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, 430-60 (1952).
50. O.W. Holmes, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 310 (1920).
51. Throughout the colonial period and right down to the last months before the
Declaration of Independence, politically conscious Americans looked upon the British
Constitution rather than natural law as the bulwark of their cherished liberties. Practi-
cal political thinking in eighteenth-century America was dominated by two assump-
tions: that the British Constitution was the best and happiest of all possible forms of
government, and that the colonists, descendents of freeborn Englishmen, enjoyed the
blessings of this constitution to the fullest extent consistent with a wilderness
environment.
C. ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 270 (1953).
It was, however, in the task of "constituting" the states and the federal union that
eighteenth-century Americans disclosed how deeply ran their constitutional positivism
and how sharply they perceived its implications for the judiciary .... [T]hose giants
who managed the awesome transition from revolutionaries to "constitutionaries"-men
like Adams and Jefferson; Dickinson and Wilson; Jay, Madison, Hamilton, and, in a
sense, Mason and Henry-were seldom, if ever, guilty of confusing law with natural
right. These men, before 1776, used nature to take the measure of law and to judge
their own obligations of obedience, but not as a source for rules of decision.
R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 26-27 (1975).
[Vol. 34:233
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the famous footnote in the Carolene Products52 case, he suggests
that legislation that restricts voting and the political processes is to
be subjected to the most exacting judicial scrutiny. Ely adopts
what he labels a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review. Some strict constructionists would ar-
gue that this approach coincides with their own in that many spe-
cific clauses of the Constitution combine to prescribe representa-
tive government in the United States."
Ely elaborates on his main theme in chapter five, "Clearing
the Channels of Political Change." Here he emphasizes the impor-
tance of the first amendment and notes that strict constructionists
such as Justice Black reach conclusions similar to his. He notes
that rights to expression are not absolute, but he fails to realize
that the English common-law environment of the Constitution set
the main constraints. "Freedom of speech" does not include every
use of the voice." Speech may not be used to defame others or to
disturb the peace of the neighborhood because the common-law
context of the constitutional protection defines the wrongs to
others that one can accomplish by voice.
A major concern within Ely's representation-reinforcing theory
of judicial review is the breadth of one substantive constitutional
limitation, the equal protection clause. He pursues this topic in
chapter six, entitled "Facilitating the Representation of Minori-
ties." Although he points out that "prejudice" is a "mushword,"
Ely uses it because he favors Justice Stone's phrase "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities." 55 Like many courts, he
also uses the word "discrimination" without rigorous definition.
Given the moral overload that large numbers of persons attach to
the words prejudice and discrimination, many social scientists sug-
gest that competent analysis of interpersonal contacts is more
likely to be achieved if neither term is used. 6
Equal protection is concerned with treating people who are in
like circumstances in exactly the same way. The legal issues center
on what are like circumstances. Ely presents a long section entitled
52. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
53. See U.S. CoNsr. arts. I, §§ 2, 4, IV, § 4; amends. XIV, § 2, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIV
XXVI.
54. On the limited definition of speech in 1791, see G. ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION-
ALIST 92-129 (1971); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERs OF
THE PEOPLE 19-28 (1960).
55. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 153-54.




"Suspicious Classification," in which he only incidentally mentions
the fountain of error on this topic, Plessy v. Ferguson.57 The Re-
publican framers of the fourteenth amendment chose broad and
unconditional language for the equal protection clause in order to
incorporate, inter alia, the ideal of making ex-slaves full citizens in
every sense by terminating all vestiges of slavery. The dissent of
Justice Harlan in Plessy analyzed the antislavery origins of the
equal protection clause. 8 Unfortunately, Justice Harlan's dissent
was the only opinion that analyzed the amendment's language in
its total context. Justice Harlan concluded that when applied to
racial issues, the equal protection clause made racial classification
more than suspect; it was totally barred: "Our Constitution is
color-blind.... ."5 Thus, Brown v. Board of Education" was the
correct interpretation for 1868 as well as 1954. The disabilities of
racial classification had not changed in eighty-six years; only recog-
nition of this fact had changed. 1 The delayed realization, in fact,
is all the more reason to apply in 1954 the remedies that should
have been available in 1868.
It is difficult to comprehend Ely's thesis that open-ended con-
stitutional clauses are needed to facilitate the representation of mi-
norities. The equal protection clause in its correct, original sense
should accomplish this goal. Ely discusses the fourth and eighth
amendments as types of equal protection clauses, 2 which seems to
contradict the argument that open-ended clauses are needed. A
final facet of this topic is the "right to travel," which is not men-
57. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). Justice
Brown for the majority noted that the prime objective of the equal protection clause "was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law ..... 163 U.S.
at 544. He upheld separate but equal facilities on a finding of fact that was clearly against
the manifest weight of the evidence: that enforced separation of former slaves would not be
a "badge of inferiority." Id. at 551. On the legislative capitulation to racism, see F. JOHNSON,
DEvELoPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE FREE NEGRO (1919); C. WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974).
58. See Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment
(pts. 1-2), 1950 Wis. L. Rav. 479, 610.
59. 163 U.S. at 559.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Court distinguished Plessy and failed to recognize that
both Plessy and Brown turned on the general connotation of the words "equal protection"
at the time of adoption of the fourteenth amendment.
61. As Judges Rives, Thomas, and Johnson recognized in a reapportionment case, "[i]f
this court ignores the long history of racial discrimination in Alabama, it will prove that
justice is both blind and deaf." Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See
C. JOHNSON, PATTERNS OF NEGRO SEGREGATION (1943); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DzLEMMA
(1944).
62. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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tioned specifically in the Constitution. Ely points to the argument
from Crandall v. Nevadaes that travel is necessary for the exercise
of political rights under the Constitution. This right could be more
solidly founded, however, on chapters forty-one and forty-two of
the Magna Carta 4 and article IV of the Articles of Confedera-
tion,e5 which guaranteed free ingress and egress to and from any
other state. Surely these provisions are part of our constitutional
protections implicit in the ninth amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
This reviewer concludes that the goal of protecting certain
rights, which spurs Ely to find open-ended sections of the Consti-
tution, can be satisfied through strict construction of constitutional
language. Ely concludes with concern that critics will think that
his approach to open-ended constitutional clauses is actually too
narrow, not giving broad enough discretion to five-member Su-
preme Court majorities to veto the legislative governance of the
nation. In fact, Ely's solution is unnecessarily broad in granting
discretion to the justices of the Court to go outside of the Consti-
tution. There is room for flexible adjudication to safeguard many
important rights within the constitutional language itself. This fact
allows the Court to address the changing needs of the nation
through strict construction, or interpretivism, without asserting an
unfettered and antidemocratic power to create new substantive
rights. The title of his book should remind Ely that most Ameri-
cans are not prepared to hand over their fates to appointed elites,
even to the Supreme Court. As he notes, they would prefer to rely
on democracy and distrust.
63. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44 (1868).
64. See C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
121-22 (1972). On the links between commerce and the right to travel, see Edwards v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
65. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908 (reprint ed. 1904). See note 27
supra. Justice Field, for a unanimous Court, stated that the right of free ingress into other
states and egress from them is implicitly incorporated in the interstate privileges and immu-
nities clause of art. IV, cl. 2 of the Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1869). See CHAFER, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 162-213 (1956).
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